Punitive Damages in Admiralty for Bad Faith Refusal to Provide Maintenance and Cure: Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc. by Reinschreiber, M. Robert, Jr.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ADMIRALTY FOR BAD
FAITH REFUSAL TO PROVIDE MAINTENANCE
AND CURE: ROBINSON V.
POCAHONTAS, INC.
In Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc., the First Circuit upheld an
award of punitive damages as a result of a shipowner's bad
faith refusal to provide maintenance and cure. An award of
this nature is unprecedented and represents one of only a few
decisions which have actually awarded punitive damages in
admiralty. This Comment examines the Robinson decision in
light of its legal foundations, the perimeters of maritime law,
and recent developments under the Jones Act and California
insurance law. The author concludes that ample grounds exist
in admiralty to support the First Circuit's award.
INTRODUCTION
Courts sitting in admiralty have so seldomly awarded punitive
damages for maritime torts that the event in itself is noteworthy. In
view of this history, the First Circuit's unprecedented decision in
Robinson v. Pocahontas, Inc.' to allow punitive damages 2 as a result
of a shipowner's refusal to provide an injured seaman with mainte-
nance and cure3 is a brave step toward compelling the shipowner to
more fully honor his ancient obligation. The purpose of this Com-
1. 477 F.2d 1048 (1st Cir. 1973).
2. The court affirmed a recovery of $21,336.06 on the maintenance and cure
count, $10,000 of which was designated as punitive.
3. Maintenance and cure is the maritime counterpart to workmen's compen-
sation. Like the landbased system of employee protection, the doctrine of main-
tenance and cure imposes liability without fault upon the shipowner for any
injury sustained by a seaman within the course of his shipboard duties. Howev-
er, unlike workmen's compensation, which is the only relief afforded to the
landbased employee, an injured seaman may bring an action for negligence and
unseaworthiness with his claim for maintenance and cure. Together, these three
remedies provide the seaman far more protection from personal injury than is
given to his shorebased counterpart.
The shipowner's liability under this doctrine extends to any injury suffered by
a seaman under his employ except those resulting from willful misconduct or
aggravation of an old injury which was knowingly concealed by the seaman at
the time of his employment. The shipowner remains liable for medical expenses
and a small living allowance until the seaman has reached the point of max-
imum cure and for wages that the seaman would have earned had he stayed
ment is to explore the propriety of this decision in light of its legal
foundations, the perimeters of maritime law, and, by analogy, recent
developments in California insurance law.
ROBINSON v. POCAHONTAS, INC.: THE FACTS
In April 1967, Earl E. Robinson, a seaman aboard the M/VArthur
J. Minners, which was engaged in fishing operations in the Gulf of
Mexico, slipped and fell on some fish slime, incurring back injuries.
After a short period of hospitalization, Robinson was fired from his
job by the ship's captain on the advice of a company physician, who,
after testing, suspected Robinson of malingering and having syphilis.
Subsequent to his discharge, Robinson's back condition became crit-
ical, requiring emergency medical care. However, further testing at a
United States Public Health Service Hospital proved negative, indi-
cating the absence of a serious back problem. After physical therapy
failed to improve his condition, Robinson placed himself under pri-
vate medical care. His ailment was then diagnosed as a herniated
disc. Corrective surgery and post-operative therapy somewhat al-
leviated Robinson's condition.
Several months later, Robinson reentered a Public Health Service
Hospital for further treatment. When his condition failed to improve,
Robinson returned to his private doctors, who diagnosed a second
ruptured disc requiring additional surgery.
Throughout this sequence of events, defendant Sea Coast, the own-
er of the M/VArthur . Minners, refused to fully honor its obligation
to pay maintenance and cure. At first, Sea Coast withheld payments
on the pretext that Robinson had contracted venereal disease and
was fired for cause. When this charge was not substantiated, the
defendant began to make irregular payments but refused to au-
thorize payment of back wages4 even though notified that the mort-
gage on Robinson's home would be foreclosed if these funds were not
disbursed. Finally, Sea Coast terminated all payments when Robin-
son rejected an inadequate settlement offer.
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS
The Robinson court based its decision to award punitive damages
healthy for the term of his employment. See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLAcK,
THE LAW OF AD mfALTY § 6-6-13 (2d ed. 1975) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE. &
BLACK].
4. A shipowner's liability for the wages of an injured fisherman extends for
the entire term of employment. For example, where the term of employment is
for the tuna season, a seaman who is injured in the service of the vessel is
entitled to either wages or to his share of the catch for the entire tuna season.
Vitco v. Joncich, 130 F. Supp. 945 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd, 234 F.2d 161 (9th Cir.
1956).
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mainly' upon Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion 6 in Vaughn v.
Atkinson,7 a case in which the majority of the Supreme Court al-
lowed an injured seaman to recover attorney's fees as a result of the
shipowner's refusal to provide maintenance and cure.8 The Court
stated:
Our question concerns damages. Counsel fees were allowed in The
Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362, 379, an admiralty suit where one party was put
to expense in recovering demurrage of a vessel wrongfully seized.
While failure to give maintenance and cure may give rise to a claim for
damages for the suffering and for the physical handicap which fol-
lows (The Iroquois, 194 U.S. 240), the recovery may also include "nec-
essary expenses." Cortes v. Baltimore InsularLine, 287 U.S. 367, 371.9
Justice Stewart was unable to agree that attorney's fees were re-
coverable as compensatory damages, but he noted that
[i]f the shipowner's refusal to pay maintenance stemmed from a wan-
ton and intentional disregard of the legal rights of the seamen, the
latter would be entitled to exemplary damages in accord with tradi-
tional concepts of the law of damages.... While the amount so
awarded would be in discretion of the fact finder, and would not
necessarily be measured by the amount of counsel fees, indirect com-
pensation for such expenditures might thus be made.
10
The First Circuit justified its reliance on this dissenting opinion by
finding that Stewart's position was "seemingly in agreement with the
majority's fundamental premise."" However, a closer look at the
5. The following cases were also cited for support: Solet v. M/V Capt. H.V.
Dufrene, 303 F. Supp. 980 (E.D. La. 1969); Roberson v. S/S American Builder, 265
F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Va. 1967); and Stewart v. S.S. Richmond, 214 F. Supp. 135
(E.D. La. 1963). However, it is difficult to read these cases as supporting the
Robinson court's position on punitive damages, for these decisions allowed only
a recovery of attorney's fees in egregious circumstances. For example, in
Stewart v. S.S. Richmond, recovery was limited to compensatory damages and
attorney's fees, even though the shipowner offered no just reason for withhold-
ing maintenance payments and the plaintiff, who had a wife and six children,
was "reduced to virtual beggary through lack of funds."
6. Justice Harlan also joined in this opinion.
7. 369 U.S. 527 (1962).
8. The majority opinion characterized the defendant's conduct in withhold-
ing such payments as follows:
In the instant case respondents were callous in their attitude, making no
investigation of libellant's claim and by their silence neither admitting
nor denying it. As a result of that recalcitrance, libellant was forced to
hire a lawyer and go to court to get what was plainly owed him under
laws that are centuries old. The default was willful and persistent. It is
difficult to imagine a clearer case of damages suffered for failure to pay
maintenance than this one.
Id. at 530-31.
9. Id. at 530.
10. Id. at 540 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
11. 477 F.2d at 1051. See also GILmORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at § 6-13, in
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majority opinion reveals that the Justices were in agreement on only
one point: Attorney's fees should be awarded because of the ship-
owner's aggravated conduct. At this point, the opinions diverge, with
the majority awarding attorney's fees as an item of compensatory
damages and the dissent arguing that they should only be recover-
able indirectly through an award of punitive damages. For this rea-
son, it is difficult to find any support for the Robinson decision in
Vaughn, other than Justice Stewart's suggestion that punitive dam-
ages are appropriate in this situation.
Generally, an award of attorney's fees as compensatory damages
runs contrary to the established "American rule,"'1 2 which disallows
a successful litigant recovery of litigation expenses, including coun-
sel fees, except when provided for by statute or by contract between
the parties. 3 The Vaughn decision, however, is uniformly cited as a
foundational case to the so-called "bad faith" exception to the
American rule.14 This exception, one of only a few deviations to the
general rule,' 5 permits recovery of attorney's fees as a result of an
unsuccessful litigant's oppressive and vexatious conduct. Although
the Court, on occasion, has referred to an award of attorney's fees
which the authors contend that the Justices unanimously agreed that punitive
damages were recoverable but that the majority chose to award "what were
essentially punitive damages under the name of counsel fees" in order to avoid
further proceedings and because of their narrow interpretation of the grant of
certiorari.
12. In England, a court, in awarding costs, has discretion whether to include
attorney's fees. This discretionary award was also permitted in colonial Ameri-
ca. However, now the accepted rule in this country is that such fees are not
ordinarily recoverable. See 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 54.77[2] (2d ed. 1976);
Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122
U. PA. L. REv. 636 (1974).
13. C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 61 (1935).
14. See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1975); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIES 198 (1973). The decision to award attorney's fees here was not unprece-
dented. Justice Douglas, writing the Vaughn majority opinion, cited Rolax v.
Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 186 F.2d 473, 481 (4th Cir. 1951), as support for his
position. This case, which is generally considered to be the progenitor of the bad
faith exception, involved union discrimination against Negroes. The Court
awarded counsel fees as a matter of equitable discretion. The Vaughn decision,
however, extended this exception into non-equity cases.
There is some support for the proposition that the Vaughn decision created a
separate maritime exception to the American rule. See Fleishman Corp. v.
Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967); Comment, Court Awarded Attor-
ney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636, 645 (1974),
This proposition finds additional support in the Court's citation to The Appolon,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824). In this case, the Supreme Court affirmed an award
of counsel fees arising from an illegal seizure of a vessel, stating that "it is the
common course of admiralty to allow expenses of this nature either in the shape
of damages, or as part of the costs." Id. at 379.
15. For a good general discussion of the history of the American rule and its
exceptions, see Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Burden Lie? 20 VAND. L,
REV. 1216 (1967).
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made under this exception as "punitive" in nature,16 because it is
triggered by conduct which might otherwise permit a recovery of
punitive damages,'" the award is considered to be an element of costs
and, therefore, compensatory. 18
Further support for the conclusion that attorney's fees in Vaughn
were awarded as an item of compensatory damages is found in the
fact that the Court allowed recovery of this expense as a matter of
law, leaving the award within the discretion of the trial court. Pro-
cedurally, this determination runs counter to the established federal
policy 19 which charges the jury with discretion in awarding punitive
damages.
20
PunvE DAMAGES IN ADMIRALTY
Because the Vaughn decision affords no new basis for recovery of
punitive damages, it is necessary to test the propriety of the Robinson
holding against Justice Stewart's suggestion that the "traditional
concepts of the law of damages" 2' should apply to a wanton with-
holding of maintenance and cure. Because of the near uniform ac-
ceptance of punitive damages by shorebased courts,2 2 one might
expect that courts sitting in admiralty have also freely utilized them
in appropriate circumstances. However, a review of the history of
punitive damages in admiralty indicates that while maritime courts
apparently accept the doctrine, they have shown a marked reluctance
to actually award such damages.23
The validity of the doctrine in a maritime action was recognized, in
dicta, by the Supreme Court in its early decision of The Amiable
Nancy.24 In this case, which arose out of a marine trespass, 2 Justice
16. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1975).
17. As a general rule punitive damages will be levied against conduct which is
willful, wanton, or reckless. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 9-10 (4th ed. 1971).
Justice Douglas, writing for the Vaughn majority, termed the defendant's con-
duct as "callous," "willful," and "persistent." 369 U.S. at 530-31.
18. See Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Burden Lie?, 20 VAND. L.
REV. 1216, 1227 (1967).
19. The law of admiralty is generally governed by federal law. See D.
ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM 136-47 (1970).
20. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851).
21. 369 U.S. at 540.
22. C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 78 (1935).
23. See Note, Punitive Damages in Admiralty, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 995 (1967),
for a comprehensive discussion of this area.
24. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818) (dictum).
25. The plaintiff, a Haytian schooner, was boarded and plundered by the
American vessel Scourge.
Story stated: "[I]f this were a suit against the original wrongdoers, it
might be proper to go yet farther,2 6 and visit upon them in the shape
of exemplary damages, the proper punishment which belongs to such
lawless misconduct. '27 Punitive damages were denied by the Court
because the defendant, the owner of the trespassing vessel, neither
authorized nor ratified the acts of its agent.
Despite this early indication from the Court that maritime law
afforded such relief, the first and only case to actually award puni-
tive damages prior to 1967 was Gallagher v. The Yankee, 28 decided in
1859. The libel in this action was brought against the captain of The
Yankee for an unlawful deportation of the libellant from California
to the Sandwich Islands. In that decision the court said: "[Flor a tort
of this kind-high-handed and deliberate, in open and contemptuous
violation of the hitherto supposed inviolable rights of the citizen-
the court should award exemplary damages.
' '29
Following Gallagher v. The Yankee, several admiralty courts con-
sidered cases in which punitive damages were at issue.3" These
courts, although recognizing the validity of the doctrine, refused to
allow its application, generally because of the particular facts or
because the defendant lacked the requisite state of mind. Therefore,
despite the lip service paid to the doctrine in these cases, its accept-
ance in admiralty remained questionable.
31
However, in a 1967 case arising out of a collision between the
Cedarville, a Great Lakes ore carrier, and a motor vessel, a federal
district court held that punitive damages could, and should, be
awarded.32 The court's opinion considered in detail the question of
whether punitive damages were ever appropriate in admiralty. Cit-
ing The Amiable Nancy33 and dicta from several other cases,3 4 the
court concluded that "[t]he cause of action for punitive damages has
26. The Court found that the defendants were "bound to repair all the real
injuries and personal wrongs sustained by the libellants .. " 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.)
at 559.
27. Id. at 558.
28. 9 F. Cas. 1091 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 30 F. Cas. 781 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1859).
29. Id. at 1093.
30. See, e.g., The Ludlow, 280 F. 162 (N.D. Fla. 1922); The Mascotte, 72 F. 684
(D.C.N.J. 1895); The Normania, 62 F. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1894).
31. Note, Punitive Damages in Admiralty, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 995, 1008 (1967).
32. In re Den Norske Amerikalinje A/S, 276 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Ohio 1967),
rev'd sub nom United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
33. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818).
34. Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 534 (1962) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Day
v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363 (1851); Ralston v. The States Rights, 20 F.
Cas. 201 (E.D. Pa. 1836); Caldwell v. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 47 N.Y. 282
(1872).
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always been recognized as an actionable right in admiralty. ' ' 35 On
appeal, the Sixth Circuit, though clearly implying that punitive dam-
ages could be assessed if given the proper facts, reversed on the
grounds that the defendant had neither ratified nor authorized the
acts of its agents.
3 6
These decisions, in combination with Justice Stewart's dissent in
Vaughn and the lack of any precedent denying the doctrine's place in
admiralty, would seem to have provided a sufficient legal basis for
the Robinson court to have premised its award. Nevertheless, the
courts' unexplained reluctance over the years to assess punitive dam-
ages remains prominent.
PUN1TmVE DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
As a general proposition, punitive damages are never awarded for
breach of contract, even where the breach is malicious or intention-
al.37 Although the precise nature of the maintenance and cure rela-
tionship is unclear, the courts have found the doctrine to be suffi-
ciently contractual to warrant application of certain contract rules in
resolving disputes between seamen and shipowners. For example, the
duty to mitigate damages,38 the right to collect prejudgment inter-
est,39 and the statute of limitations for oral contracts40 have been
utilized in maintenance and cure suits. In Robinson, the defendant
contended that the contract rule regarding punitive damages should
apply to a breach of duty to provide maintenance and cure. The First
Circuit rejected this defense with little difficulty by reference to the
Supreme Court's statement in Vaughn:
Maintenance and cure differs from rights normally classified as con-
tractual. As Mr. Justice Cardozo said in Cortes v. Baltimore Insular
Line, the duty to provide maintenance and cure "is imposed by the
law itself as one annexed to employment .... Contractual it is in the
sense that it has its source in a relation which is contractual in origin,
but given the relation, no agreement is competent to abrogate the
incident." 4
1
35. 276 F. Supp. at 172.
36. United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
37. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 81 (1935).
38. Vaughn v. Atkinson, 291 F.2d 813 (4th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 369 U.S. 527 (1962);
Wilson v. United States, 299 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1956).
39. Donchette v. Vincent, 194 F.2d 834-(Ist Cir. 1952).
40. Phillips v. Luchenbach Steamship Co., 227 F. Supp. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
41. 369 U.S. at 532-33.
The problem in classifying maintenance and cure stems largely
from the fact that "the seaman's right was firmly established in
maritime law long before recognition of the distinction between tort
and contract." 42 The courts have explained its origin as arising from
"the law's concern for a seaman becoming sick, disabled or ill in the
service of the ship, '43 and as "a material ingredient in the compensa-
tion for the labour and services" 44 of a seaman. In any event, how-
ever, the Supreme Court has recognized that "[s]ome of the grounds
for recovery of maintenance and cure would, in modern terminology,
be classified as torts.
'45
On a more pragmatic level, the courts have seemed to pick and
choose between applying tort or contract rules in a result-oriented
fashion.46 Several decisions have extended beyond any contractual
constraints to find a seaman entitled to maintenance and cure bene-
fits even before the signing of the articles of employment. 4 And one
court, in allowing an award of consequential damages for breach of a
shipowner's duty to pay maintenance, has simply held that "[w]e do
not think. . . that the usual rules of damages for breach of contract
to pay money are applicable.
'48
In light of these considerations, there was ample discretion for the
Robinson court to choose not to apply the contract rule forbidding an
award of punitive damages in the maintenance and cure setting.
42. O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Co., 318 U.S. 36, 42 (1943).
43. Isthmian Lines, Inc. v. Haire, 334 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1964). See also
Dryden v. Ocean Accident & Guar. Corp., Ltd., 138 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1943), in
which the court said:
lain employee-employer relationship is a contractual one. Probably
many of the details of that relationship-wages, hours, etc., are fixed by
specific contract provisions and are express contractual rights. But the
right here sought to be enforced by the seamen was not founded on a"meeting of the minds"-it was inexorably attached by ancient and
established maritime law to every seaman's contract of employment.
The parties had no choice in the matter. It was a duty superimposed by
law coincidental with the formation of the contractual relation. The
seamen could not contract against it-his or his employer's will is pow-
erless to destroy it. This aspect alone reflects the true nature of the right
here sought to be enforced. It is a right which the maritime law, in the
wisdom of experience, found necessary and just, for the complete pro-
tection of seamen, whom maritime law treated as "wards of admiralty."
Id. at 293.
44. Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480,481 (C.C.D. Me. 1823). See also Warren v.
United States, 75 F. Supp. 836 (D. Mass. 1948).
45. O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Co., 318 U.S. 36, 42 (1943).
46. An example of this attitude is seen in Sperbeck v. A.L. Burbank Co., 88 F.
Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), where the court, wishing to preserve the cause of
action in spite of the death of the seaman, chose to classify the right as contrac-
tual.
47. See, e.g., Martinez v. Marine Transport Lines, Inc., 1947 A.M.C. 529 (1947);
Taylor v. United Fruit Co., 1947 A.M.C. 164 (1946).
48. Sims v. United States War Shipping Adm'n, 186 F.2d 972, 974 (3d Cir.
1951). The cause of action was based only on failure to provide maintenance.
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PUNIVE DAMAGES UNDER THE JoNEs ACT
Depending upon the type of injury alleged, a seaman may elect to
bring an action for damages resulting from a negligent failure to
provide maintenance and cure under the Jones Act 49 rather than
under the General Maritime Law. Although the extent of permissible
damages under the Jones Act was not considered in the Robinson
case, a seaman opting to sue under this Act would, in appropriate
circumstances, have substantial basis to argue that punitive damages
should be recoverable.
Briefly, the Jones Act is the vehicle which allows a seaman to bring
an action at law for injuries sustained in the course of his employ-
ment. In the absence of statutory authority, the General Maritime
Law affords a seaman no relief for injuries caused by the negligence
of the master or fellow crew members.5" The Jones Act, designed to
alleviate this harsh rule, incorporates all the rights and remedies
given to railroad workers under the Federal Employees Liability Act
(FELA).51 Together, these two acts provide for survival of the injured
seaman's right of action in favor of his personal representative" and
further provide that contributory negligence will not bar a seaman's
action but only diminish his recovery. 53 The courts have held that
measure of damages under the Jones Act and the FELA is identical54
and that cases decided under one are persuasive precedent in an
action brought under the other.55 Therefore, it is proper to consider
FELA cases in determining the scope of recovery under the Jones
Act.
The Supreme Court first recognized the right of the seaman to elect
between the Jones Act and the General Maritime Law in Cortes v.
Baltimore Insular Line.56 This case centered around the death of a
49. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
50. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
51. 45 U.S.C. 99 51-60 (1970).
52. Id. § 59 (1964).
53. Id. § 53.
54. See, e.g., Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342 (1937); Martin v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 268 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1959).
55. See 10 A.L.R. Fed. 511, 519 (1972). The Supreme Court, however, has not
adopted this as a hard and fast rule. In Cox v. Roth, 348 U.S. 207, 209 (1955), the
Court held that the provisions of the FELA should not be mechanically applied
to maritime claims but that the admiralty setting must be considered in deter-
mining Congress' intent in enacting the Jones Act. Nevertheless, as a practical
matter, cases decided under one should weigh fully in actions brought under the
other.
56. 287 U.S. 367 (1932).
seaman who died from pneumonia contracted aboard the defendant's
ship. The administrator of the deceased seaman's estate alleged that
the death resulted from the failure of the ship's captain to give the
seaman proper care. An action for damages was brought under the
Jones Act because claims under the General Maritime Law did not
survive a deceased seaman. The issue before the Court was whether a
death, which results from the negligent omission to furnish cure, is a
personal injury within the meaning of the Jones Act. Writing for the
Court, Justice Cardozo stated:
We think the origin of the duty [to provide maintenance and cure] is
consistent with a remedy in tort, since the wrong, if a violation of a
contract, is also something more. The duty, as already pointed out, is
one annexed by law to a relation, and annexed as an inseparable
incident without heed to any expression of will of the contracting
parties. For a breach of duty thus imposed, the remedy upon the
contract does not exclude any alternative remedy built upon the tort.
57
Having decided that a failure to provide maintenance or cure could
result in tort liability, Justice Cardozo then turned his attention to
the circumstances in which a master's withholding would result in a
negligent personal injury which the statute requires. Using illustra-
tions to make this point,58 Justice Cardozo drew a distinction be-
tween the seaman who suffers physical or mental injury and the
seaman who merely experiences an economic setback on account of
the master's failure to provide either maintenance or cure. The for-
mer was held to have suffered a "personal injury" within the mean-
ing of the Jones Act while the latter fell outside the statutory scope.59
An injured seaman, then, whose physical condition is aggravated by
his employer's withholding of proper maintenance or cure, need only
prove that the employer was negligent in his handling of the matter
to bring himself within the spectrum of damages available under the
Jones Act.6"
57. Id. at 372.
58. Cardozo illustrated this point with three factual situations. The first is
where a seaman is starved during the voyage in disregard of the duty to give
maintenance, and whose health is permanently impaired. The second is where a
seaman is slightly wounded through his own doing, but whose injuries are
greatly aggravated from lack of care. In these two factual settings, Justice
Cardozo found that "there is little doubt that in the common speech of men he
would be said to have suffered a personal injury ... ." Id. at 373. The third
illustration involves the situation where an injured seaman is able to borrow in
order to provide for his own maintenance or cure. In this circumstance, Justice
Cardozo thought there to be no personal injury. Thus, the seaman's only remedy
is for his expenditures.
59. Id. at 373-74.
60. See, e.g., De Zon v. American President Lines, Ltd., 318 U.S. 660 (1941);
Central Gulf Steamship Corp. v. Sambula, 405 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1968); Per-
meaux v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 198 Mo. App. 463, 192 S.W.2d 138 (1946);
GnmORE & BLAcK, supra note 3, at § 6-13.
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Damages Under the Jones Act
Whether the Jones Act and the FELA permit an award of punitive
damages is a question highlighted by recent litigation in the Sixth
Circuit. That circuit, the first to decide the issue, has split; it allowed
punitive damages in a case brought under the Jones Act but denied
them in a FELA action. Such a result is anomolous because it runs
contrary to the rule requiring an identity of recovery between the two
acts.61 Nevertheless, a review of these cases illuminates the in-
tricacies of the issue which, in the future, will need to be settled.
The first case to consider the question was In re Den Norske
Amerikalinje A/S (the Cedarville),62 which squarely raised the issue
of whether the defendant, United States Steel Corporation, could be
held accountable for punitive damages on account of a collision
between its steamship, the Cedarville, and a Norwegian vessel, in
which several of the Cedarville's crew were killed or injured. The
district court held that punitive damages were within the spectrum
of remedies available in a maritime proceeding, generally, 63 and
under the survival portion of the Jones Act, specifically.
64
United States Steel argued that punitive damages could not be
assessed under the Jones Act because the statute did not specifically
provide for them. This contention, however, was easily swept aside
by the court on the grounds that "specific reference is neither com-
mon nor necessary ' 65 in federal statutes because exemplary damages
are a creature of common law. Furthermore, the court found that
61. See notes 54 & 55 and accompanying text supra.
62. 276 F. Supp. 163 (N.D. Ohio 1967), rev'd sub nom. United States Steel Corp.
v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
63. Id. at 174.
64. Id. at 176. The court cited The Amiable Nancy, 16 U.S. 546 (1818); Ralston
v. The States Rights, 20 F. Cas. 201 (E.D. Pa. 1836); Caldwell v. New Jersey
Steamboat Co., 47 N.Y. 282 (1872), for the proposition that punitive damages are
available in admiralty, and Cain v. Southern R.R., 199 F. 211 (D.C. Tenn. 1911), to
bolster its specific holding. In Cain, which involved a wrongful death action
brought under the FELA, the court clearly implied that punitive damages might
have been available in a survival action if such an action were allowed under the
Act (the survival section of the act was later added by amendment). The court
also cited Ennis v. Yazoo & M. Valley R.R., 188 Miss. 509, 79 So. 73 (1918), as
precedent for the proposition that punitive damages are recoverable under the
FELA. This decision, however, is also susceptible to a reading that punitive
damages are not necessarily available because it is unclear whether the trial
court's punitive award was based on state common law or under the FELA's
survival section. In any event, the trial court's award was overturned on appeal.
See 10 A.L.R. Fed. 511, 537 (1972).
65. 276 F. Supp. at 176.
other statutes which employ the same general language as the Jones
Act have been interpreted as allowing punitive relief.6
On appeal, this decision was vacated sub nom on the ground that
United States Steel had not authorized or ratified the acts of the
Cedarville's captain, a fact upon which the lower court had predi-
cated its judgment.6 7 Although this disposition of the case did not
allow the court to reach the issue, it implied that, given the proper
facts, punitive damages would be recoverable under the Jones Act.68
In Kozar v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway,69 a subsequent litiga-
tion arising under the FELA, the question was reconsidered. The
district court, in a detailed opinion, held that a deceased railway
worker's estate could collect punitive damages under the survival
provisions of the Act. Because of the limited case law addressing the
question,70 the court buttressed its decision on congressional intent
66. For example, the court cited Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965), as
interpreting the general language of the Civil Rights Act, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13
(1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)), to allow punitive damages, and Nagel
v. Prescott, 36 F.R.D. 445 (N.D. Ohio 1964), as construing the general language of
the Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, § 1, 48 Stat. 74 (as codified at 15 U.S.C §
77a-77aa (1970)), as also permitting punitive damages.
67. United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhrman, 407 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970).
68. The court said:
We think the better rule is that punitive damages are not recoverable
against the owner of a vessel for the act of the master unless it can be
shown that the owner authorized or ratified the acts of the master either
before or after the accident. Punitive damages also may be recoverable
if the acts complained of were those of an unfit master and the owner
was reckless in employing him.
Id. at 1148.
69. 320 F. Supp. 335 (W.D. Mich. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 449 F.2d
1238 (6th Cir. 1971).
70. The court cited the following cases as authority: Missouri-K-T R.R. of
Texas v. Ridgeway, 191 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1951); Cain v. Southern Ry., 199 F. 211
(D.C. Tenn. 1911); Helsel v. Pennsylvania R.R., 84 F. Supp. 296 (E.D.N.Y. 1949);
Gunnip v. Warner Co., 43 F.R.D. 365 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Ennis v. Yazoo & M.V. Ry.,
118 Miss. 509, 79 So. 73 (1918).
With the exception of the Gunnip decision, the Kozar court read these cases
as allowing compensatory recovery only. And in Gunnip, although the court
allowed a seaman to amend his Jones Act complaint to pray for punitive dam-
ages, it expressly reserved the question of whether such damages might be
recovered. Therefore, after considering the limited precedential value of these
decisions, the Kozar court found that only United States Steel Corp. v. Fuhr-
man "seems to stand as authority." 320 F. Supp. at 350.
The courts have consistently overlooked Phillip v. United States Lines Co., 240
F. Supp. 992 (E.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd, 355 F.2d 25 (3d Cir. 1966) and Mpiliris v.
Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 323 F. Supp. 865, 894 (S.D. Tex. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1163
(5th Cir. 1971). Both the district court and the appellate court in the Phillip case
expressly reserved the question of whether, under the proper facts, a punitive
award could be allowed under the Jones Act. The court of appeals, by citing
Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965), a case which allowed punitive dam-
ages under a federal statute employing the same general language as the Jones
Act, seemed to imply that it would allow such a recovery under different facts.
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in enacting the statute. It found that Congress' intent was to safe-
guard the health of railroad employees7' by extending and enlarging
the remedies available to an injured worker under the common law.72
Furthermore, the court reasoned that a railway could have been held
liable for punitive damages prior to the enactment of the FELA7 3 and
that there is no reason to believe that Congress sought to limit this
recovery in light of the Act's paternal purposes.7 4
On appeal, the circuit court disagreed with the lower court on all
points and reversed.75 First, the circuit court reasoned that while
indeed Congress did not intend to limit available remedies at com-
mon law, the lower court was mistaken in characterizing "the right
to recover punitive damages at common law a 'common law reme-
dy.' ",76 Second, the court found a series of "clear, unambiguous
statements in the line of Supreme Court authorities holding that
damages recoverable under the act are compensatory only." 77 Den
Norske was laid aside because it was reversed by Fuhrman, about
which the court said: "Any inference that may be extracted from the
reading of Fuhrman that punitive damages may be recoverable in an
admiralty proceeding cannot be regarded as controlling in this
case." 7
8
Of the four courts within the Sixth Circuit to consider the question,
three have either expressly or impliedly indicated that, given proper
facts, punitive damages can be awarded in suits brought under the
acts. One commentator who has noted the lower court decision in
Kozar has concluded that the FELA "does not of itself preclude
punitive damages in appropriate situations" ;79 another author found
In Mpiliris, the district court concluded that the facts did not warrant an award
of punitive damages under the Jones Act.
71. 320 F. Supp. at 346-47. This sentiment would apply with equal force in
admiralty because the Jones Act has been construed as remedial legislation "for
the benefit and protection of seamen who are peculiarly the wards of admir-
alty." Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 123 (1936).
72. 320 F. Supp. at 347-50.
73. Id. at 353.
74. Id. at 355.
75. Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 449 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir. 1971).
76. Id. at 1240. The appellate court concluded that punitive damages is a
damages theory which is quite distinct from a remedy.
77. Id. at 1242. The court cited the following cases: Michigan Cent. R.R. v.
Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913); American R.R. v. Didricksen, 227 U.S. 145 (1913);
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. McGinnis, 228 U.S. 173 (1913).
78. 449 F.2d at 1243.
79. Recent Developments, Punitive Damages May Be Awarded Under the
Federal Employees Liability Act, 71 CoLuM. L. REV. 1113, 1115 (1971).
that assessment of such damages falls within the purview of congres-
sional intent.80 The conclusions of these commentators run contrary
to the Kozar circuit court and would seem to cast a shadow on the
strength of that decision. Furthermore, the appellate opinion in
Kozar failed to adequately come to grips with the Cedarville prece-
dent by distinguishing it as "an admiralty proceeding." By disposing
of Cedarville in this manner, the circuit court ignored the vital fact
that Jones Act cases are closely tied to the FELA by history and
decision.
Moragne v. States Marine Lines
The extent of recoverable damages under the Jones Act has been
further complicated by the Supreme Court's recent decision of
Moragne v. States Marine Lines,81 which has thrown the area of
maritime wrongful death into chaos. Prior to this decision, maritime
death actions were governed by the venerable rule of The Harris-
burg82 that maritime law afforded no remedy for wrongful death. The
Jones Act and a companion statute, the Death on the High Seas Act
(DOHSA),83 were enacted, in part, to fill the void left by The Harris-
burg rule. In Moragne, the Court overturned The Harrisburg and
held that an action "does lie under the General Maritime Law for
death caused by violation of maritime duties." 84 This new rule is
troublesome because it replaces the void that the Jones Act death
sections were designed to fill, leaving the relationship between the
two in a state of uncertainty. 85 Although it may take many years
before the boundaries of the Moragne rule are precisely defined,
early authority8 6 indicates that Moragne may either supplement or
80. Note, Punitive Damages Under the Federal Employees Liability Act, 40
U. CiN. L. REV. 289, 297 (1971).
81. 398 U.S. 375 (1970). This action arose out of the death of a longshoreman
while working aboard a vessel in navigable waters within the state of Florida.
82. 119 U.S. 199 (1886). This decision followed the traditional common law
rule developed in Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808), that a right of action
expires with the victim.
83. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768 (1970). This Act provides a remedy for death "caused
by wrongful act, neglect or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine
league from the shore of any state." Id. § 761. The DOHSA permits only a
recovery for wrongful death without a survival action.
84. 398 U.S. at 409.
85. It appears that the Moragne remedy reaches deaths which would other-
wise be covered by either the Jones Act or DOHSA. See, e.g., Law v. Sea Drilling
Corp., 523 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1975); Renner v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 403 F. Supp,
849 (C.D. Cal. 1975); GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at § 6-32.
86. In George & Moore, Wrongful Death and Survival Actions Under the
General Maritime Law: Pre-Harrisburg Through Post-Moragne, 4 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 1, 17 (1972), the authors contend that the Jones Act and the DOHSA "were
enacted to fill a void in the General Maritime Law, and as such there was clearly
no congressional intent to make an action under the General Maritime Law
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entirely displace a death recovery under the Jones Act. Such a result
would allow a deceased seaman's estate to claim damages under the
General Maritime Law free of any statutory limitations.
Generally, punitive damages, if allowed for wrongful death, are
recoverable in a survival action where damages are measured by the
wrong done to the decedent.8 7 One of the questions left by the Court
in Moragne "for further sifting through the lower courts"
88 was
whether a wrongful death action under the General Maritime Law
permits a decendent's claims to survive his death, or whether the
recovery is limited to the loss to his dependents. Those lower courts
which have thus far considered the question have held that survival
rights are inherent in an action for wrongful death under the General
Maritime Law,89 and, in dicta, have indicated that punitive damages
may be assessed in a maritime survival action.
90
subservient to a cause of action under either or both statutes." In Note,
Maritime Wrongful Death and Survival Actions: A Moragne ForAll Waters, 22
Loy. L. REV. 646, 659 (1976), the author states:
There is also the remote possibility that the Jones Act survival action
will be entirely displaced by the new federal maritime survival action;
that is, claims for a decedent seaman's conscious pain and suffering,
caused by either the employer's negligence or the vessel's unseaworthi-
ness, might be asserted solely under the federal maritime survival
action.
See also GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at § 6-33.
87. In the absence of express or implied language in the wrongful death
statute authorizing a punitive award, the usual rule is that such damages are not
recoverable. This rule has developed because the goal of the wrongful death
action is to recompense the loss the death caused to the survivors. See D. DOBBS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES, 556-68 (1973).
The Jones Act, the FELA, and the DOHSA have adopted this measure of
damages. See, e.g., Van Beeck v. Sabine Towing Co., 300 U.S. 342 (1937) (Jones
Act claim); Moore-McCormick Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.
1961) (DOHSA claim); Allendorf v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry., 8 Ill. 2d 164, 133
N.E.2d 288 (1956) (FELA claim). In proper circumstances, however, punitive
damages may be recovered in a survival action where damages are measured by
the wrong done to the decedent before his death. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF REMEDIES 552-55 (1973).
88. 398 U.S. at 408.
89. See, e.g., Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 948 (1972); Greene v. Vintage Steamship Corp., 466 F.2d 159 (4th Cir.
1972); Dennis v. Central Gulf Steamship Corp., 323 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. La. 1971),
aff'd, 453 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); 2 BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 86 (7th ed. 1975).
90. See, e.g., Renner v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 403 F. Supp. 849, 852 (C.D. Cal.
1975) (the court, in listing those items of damages recoverable under Moragne
stated: "The damages recoverable in a survival action traditionally include all
'loss or damage [which] decedent sustained or incurred prior to his death,
including any penalties or punitive or exemplary damages that the decedent
would have been entitled to recover had he lived. . . .' Cal. Probate Code § 573
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For these reasons it appears that punitive damages are likely to be
available in a Moragne styled wrongful death action. However, if the
remedy under the General Maritime Law does, indeed, supplement or
displace the Jones Act survival action, the law may take the peculiar
posture that punitive damages would be allowed where the injured
seaman dies, but denied under Kozar if he lives. Such a result, of
course, is illogical in light of the purpose behind a survival action
which is to merely allow a personal representative to pursue whatev-
er claims the decedent would have had had he lived.91
ToRTous BREACH OF CONTRACT
Justice Cardozo, in the Cortes opinion, observed that a breach of a
contractual obligation may result in tort liability. In that decision he
stated: "We think the origin of the duty [to provide maintenance and
cure] is consistent with a remedy in tort, since the wrong, if a viola-
tion of contract, is also something more .... The remedy upon the
contract does not exclude an alternative remedy built upon the
tort. '92
This theory has come to be known as "tortious breach of con-
tract, ' 93 and its application enables courts to award recoveries be-
yond the usual measure of contract damages. In the most recent
extension of this theory the California courts have held that an
insurer's bad faith disposition of a claim against it may result in a
tortious breach of contract.94 These courts have read into the insur-
ance agreement an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing on
both parties. 9 This duty encompasses other duties, one of which
places upon the insurer the responsibility not to unreasonably with-
hold-or threaten to withhold-policy payments without probable
... "); Green v. Ross, 388 F. Supp. 365 (S.D. Fla. 1972), affd, 481 F.2d 102 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1068 (1973) (the court inferred that punitive damages
might be recoverable in a General Maritime Law survival claim).
91. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 553 (1973).
92. 287 U.S. at 372.
93. The Cortes opinion has been cited as recognizing the theory of "tortious
breach of contract." See, e.g., Sperbeck v. A.L. Burbank & Co., 190 F.2d 449,453
(2d Cir. 1951).
94. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 556, 573-74, 510 P.2d 1032, 1037, 108
Cal. Rptr. 480,485 (1973); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425,430, 426 P.2d
173, 176-77, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16-17 (1967); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93 (1970).
95. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 556,573,510 P.2d 1032, 1036, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480, 484 (1973); Comunale v. Traders Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 658, 328
P.2d 198, 200 (1958).
96. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 556,575,510 P.2d 1032, 1038, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480, 486 (1973); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376,
401, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93 (1970).
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cause to do so.16 These duties exist independently of any contractual
terms,97 and breach of any of them sounds in tort regardless of the
fact that the breach may also constitute a breach of contract. 8 Once a
derogation of this implied duty is proven, the breaching party may
become liable for the entire spectrum of tort damages, including
punitive damages where appropriate. 99
Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co. 100 is illustrative of
the California approach and is important to the present discussion
because substantial punitive damages were awarded on facts re-
markably similar to a shipowner's withholding of maintenance and
cure. In this case the plaintiff suffered back injuries as a result of an
industrial accident. He was placed on disability and eventually fired
from his job. There was virtually a unanimous agreement among
numerous doctors, including an independent medical examiner, that
the plaintiff's disability resulted from the accident.
Although these medical opinions were known to the defendant
insurer, its claims manager decided that the claim was one for sick-
ness and not injury, a decision which greatly reduced the insurer's
liability.1 1 Subsequently, the claims manager, upon the strength of a
single doctor's opinion, concluded that the insured's condition was in
part caused by a concealed congenital back problem, notified the
plaintiff that no further payments would be made, and demanded
restoration of all policy benefits. Finally, the insurer offered to settle
the dispute by allowing the plaintiff to retain the policy benefits
already paid in return for a cancellation of the policy and a full
release. The defendants conceded that this conduct was "outrage-
ous," and the jury impliedly found that the defendants acted either
with the intent to cause the plaintiff emotional distress or with
reckless disregard of this result.
97. Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 556,578,510 P.2d 1032, 1040, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480, 488 (1973).
98. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 432-34, 426 P.2d 173, 178-79, 58
Cal. Rptr. 13, 18-19 (1967); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d
376, 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93 (1970).
99. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 63 Cal. App. 3d 659, 678, 133 Cal. Rptr.
899, 911 (1976); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376,401-02,
89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93-94 (1970).
100. 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
101. The policy provided coverage of $150 per month for a two year max-
imum period in case of sickness and $150 per month for a maximum period of 30
years in the event of injury.
On the theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
court of appeal upheld the jury's award of compensatory and puni-
tive damages 10 2 against both the insurer and the claims manager. The
defendant contended that punitive damages were improper because
the case sounded in contract. 103 The court, while recognizing this
argument, 10 4 rejected it on the grounds that the action arose from an
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing which obligated the
insurer not to do anything which would deprive the insured of the
policy benefits. Such an action sounds in tort irrespective of the fact
that a breach of contract may be involved, 05 and punitive damages
are allowed in the proper case.
10 6
Because of the similar position of insurer to insured and shipowner
to seaman, it is very tempting to draw a strong analogy between the
California line of bad faith insurance cases and a failure to provide
maintenance and cure. There are, however, several considerations
which may stand between such an analogy. First, on a factual level,
insurance contracts are quite distinct from contracts of employment.
Because the insurance business is thought to be "affected with the
public interest" and subject to stringent regulation, 10 7 the courts
have long recognized the special nature of the insurance contract. 10 8
In Fletcher, for instance, the court observed that the insurance in-
dustry is "governmentally regulated to a substantial degree. It is
affected with a public interest and offers services of a quasi-public
nature."'1 9 The Fletcher court further concluded that a special rela-
tionship exists between an insurer and its insured which is the by-
product of "the great disparity in the economic situations and bar-
gaining abilities of the insurer and the insured," 10 as well as "the
fact that the insured does not contract . . . to obtain a commercial
advantage but to protect [himself] against the risks of accidental
losses . .. ."-I"
102. The jury awarded $10,000 punitive damages against the claims manager
and $640,000 against the insurer. The trial judge ordered a remittitur, reducing
the award to $180,000, which was accepted by the plaintiff. The lesser amount
was upheld on appeal.
103. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 400, 404, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 92, 95.
104. The court rejected the contention that the award of punitive damages
was improper because the case sounded in contract. The court reasoned that the
defendant's conduct was essentially tortious and that full tort damages could be
recovered despite the fact that the conduct also amounted to a breach of con-
tract. Id. at 400-02, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94.
105. Id. at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
106. Id. at 401-02, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94.
107. See, e.g., W. VANCE, INSURANCE 36 (3d ed. 1951).
108. See, e.g., Bekken v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 70 N.D. 122,293 N.W. 200
(1940).
109. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 403, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
110. Id. at 403-04, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
111. Id. at 404, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
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To some extent, however, these same considerations are applicable
to the maritime employment contract. Certainly, it may be contended
that the seaman is in an unequal bargaining position, although the
existence of labor unions considerably dilutes the force of this con-
tention. More persuasively, though, it can be argued that the very
origin of the maintenance and cure relationship lies in the law's
concern for the seaman's well-being. Therefore, implying a duty of
good faith into the relationship would go far in implementing this
concern.
Second, it must be remembered that the General Maritime Law
does not allow a seaman to recover for injuries sustained by the
negligence of the shipowner.112 An action for breach of the duty to
deal in good faith would probably have to be brought under the Jones
Act,"' attendant with the uncertain state of punitive damages under
that Act. The practical effect of funnelling a breach of this duty
through the Jones Act would be to afford the injured seaman no
greater recovery than is already available to him under the Cortes
decision. Thus, the analogy to insurance law is not very helpful in
expanding the basis for an injured seaman to recover punitive
damages.
Finally, it should be noted that even if the above contentions are
found to be logically sound and weighty, admiralty courts will not
ordinarily find landbased law to be persuasive by analogy unless the
proposed change is accepted with near uniformity by common law
courts." 4 At present, the California approach has not gained accept-
112. See, e.g., The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903), which held that a seaman has
no action under the General Maritime Law for injuries sustained through the
negligence of his master. This decision left the seaman with only his remedy for
maintenance and cure.
113. The concept of negligence under the Jones Act is broad enough to en-
compass even intentional torts when committed in the course of the employer's
business. See M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 691 (3d ed. 1970). For this reason,
a breach of the duty to deal in good faith which amounts to an intentional
infliction of emotional distress will likely fall within the purview of the Jones
Act. If, however, an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress would
be actionable through the General Maritime Law, a recovery of punitive dam-
ages under such a theory would encounter the same historical reluctance which
presently exists in actions for punitive damages caused by refusal to provide
maintenance and cure. Therefore, even if an action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress were allowed under the General Maritime Law, an injured
seaman would not have an expanded basis for recovering punitive damages.
114. See, e.g., Igneri v. Cie de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257 (2d Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964); Sevits v. McKiernan-Terry Corp., 264 F.
Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 929 (D.
Del. 1962).
ance outside of that state, though several states seem receptive to the
idea.115
STANDARD OF CONDUCT
Whereas compensatory damages are awarded to compensate the
plaintiff for his injuries, punitive damages are levied as punishment
or deterrent because of the nature of the defendant's conduct."'
Generally, conduct which is willful, wanton, or reckless justifies an
award of punitive damages."" These adjectives are employed to de-
scribe conduct which, though still only negligent, is so highly un-
reasonable and at such great variance from ordinary care" 8 that it is
treated as if it were intended.
119
There is no logical reason why punitive damages in admiralty
should be governed by a different standard. Those few admiralty
courts which have dealt with the question have applied this general
rule. In The Amiable Nancy,20 the Court described the defendant's
conduct as a "gross and wanton outrage, without any just provoca-
tion or excuse."'12 More recently, in the Cedarville case, a federal
district court held that punitive damages could be recovered where
the master's "misconduct evinces a reckless and wanton disregard
for the rights of the claimants."'
1 22
Although the Robinson court made no explicit finding as to the
culpability of the defendant, for its guideline it seemed to follow the
usual common law standard by quoting the Vaughn dissent requiring
"wanton and intentional disregard of the legal rights of the sea-
men."123 The Robinson opinion, however, is unclear as to which of
the defendant's acts met this requirement. From the facts as given,
1 4
it is fair to assume that the award was not based on the failure to give
either maintenance or cure but on the third part of this doctrine, the
shipowner's duty to pay back wages. 125 Such an assumption is based
115. See, e.g., Campbell v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 525, 531
(Fla. 1971); Amsden v. Grinnell Mut. Reins. Co., 203 N.W.2d 252, 254 (Iowa 1972);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d 1070, 1071
(1975).
116. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 204 (1973).
117. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON TiE LAW OF ToRTs 9-10 (4th ed. 1971).
118. Id. at 10.
119. C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 79 (1935).
120. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818).
121. Id. at 558.
122. 276 F. Supp. at 198.
123. 369 U.S. at 540 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
124. See text accompanying notes 3-5 supra.
125. Liability for back wages arises in the same manner as maintenance and
cure-that is, a seaman who is injured in the service of the ship becomes entitled
to wages which he would have earned had he remained healthy for the entire
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on the rule that a shipowner is not liable for private medical expenses
unless the seaman is able to bear his burden of proving that "proper
and adequate care was not available at [a Public Health Service]
hospital."' 2 6 As the court made no specific finding that the defendant
knew the exact extent of its liability, it can be inferred that the
defendant held some doubt as to its duty12 7 to provide both mainte-
nance and cure. Such a doubt would probably remove a defendant
from punitive liability. The facts further seem to indicate that Sea
Coast should have known of its liability for back wages and did in
fact know that withholding these wages would cause Robinson to
lose his home. It is hard facts like these which would authorize an
assessment of punitive damages against the wrongdoer.
CONCLUSION
In awarding punitive damages for bad faith refusal to provide
maintenance and cure, the Robinson decision is responsive to the
traditional maritime concern for seamei's well-being. This concern
lies at the very origin of the maintenance and cure doctrine, and a
judicious use of punitive damages in proper circumstances would go
far toward implementing this policy. From this perspective, then, it
must be concluded that the Robinson case was correctly decided.
When viewed from a strictly legal standpoint, the decision was
without a strong foundation in admiralty law. At present, however,
the law of admiralty is only a step away from recognizing the propri-
ety of awarding punitive damages for bad faith refusal to provide
maintenance and cure. Although punitive damages have almost nev-
er been awarded in admiralty, there is no reason to believe that the
General Maritime Law does not sanction such an award. Further-
more, where the circumstances are such as to allow an action for
punitive damages under the Jones Act, an injured seaman would
term of his employment. See GiLMORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at § 6-12; notes 3 &
4 supra.
126. Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 737 (1961). See also GILMORE &
BLACK, supra note 3, at § 6-11.
127. In this instance the shipowner's duty to pay maintenance was somewhat
contingent upon his duty to provide private medical care. This is so because a
shipowner is not liable for maintenance payments during the time the seaman
spends in the hospital, for the seaman incurs no living expenses inside the
hospital. See GiLmORE & BLACK, supra note 3, at § 6-12. Sea Coast's liability to
pay maintenance was contingent upon it's liability to pay for private medical
care. Therefore, it is arguable that it also held a good faith doubt as to whether
or not Robinson was entitled to maintenance payments for the time he spent in
the hospital under private care.
have promising grounds to argue that punitive damages should be
awarded. The Cedarville litigation has laid a solid framework for a
punitive recovery under the Jones Act, although the refusal to allow
punitive damages under the FELA will eventually need to be recon-
ciled. In addition, the development of punitive damages in California
insurance law can serve as a possible model for maritime courts to
follow. Therefore, if the courts are willing to put aside their historical
reluctance to allow punitive damages, the Robinson decision is likely
to be followed in the future.
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